Historical References of Bakhtiyari Tribe

Perhaps the earliest written reference to the Bakhtiyari dates from approximately 1330 A.D. in Hamdullah Mostaufi‘s Tarikh-e Gozideh, and possibly the earliest written reference to the divisions of the Haft Leng and Chahar Leng is in Muhammad Kazem’s Nameh-ye ‘Alam Ara-ye Naderi, ca. 1740 A.D.

 

A In the Tarikh-e Gozideh the Bakhtiyari and the Osteraki, which is one of the tayefeh of the Haft Leng, are mentioned as two of the tribes which came from Syria 17′ to join the Atabeg Hazaraf (ca. the beginning of the thirteenth century). There is some question in the text of the Tarikh-e Gozideh whether the reference is actually to the Bakhtiyari; apparently, it could also be read ‘hr-khtari.” This incident is repeated again in the Sharafnameh (ca. 1596), which is most likely based on the Tarikh-e Gozideh, 19 but it also adds that the leadership of Lur-e Bozorg, which was known as the Bakhtiyari, was entrusted to Taj Amir, Khan of the Osteraki, by Shah Tahmasp (1524 – 1575) in return for an annual payment of a large sum. Taj Amir was unable to make the payment and was killed by Tahmasp. In his place Shah Tahmasp appointed Jahangir-e Bakhtiyari, one of the leaders of that tribe, in return for an annual payment of the equivalent of 10,000 miles to his treasury; this payment was guaranteed by Shah Rustam, governor of Luristan. Significantly, in return, Jahangir Khan was given the right to collect the taxes of certain districts of Khuzistan, Dizful, and Shustar, which had formerly been entrusted to Arab leaders in that area.

 

The Tarikh-e ‘Alam Ara-ye ‘Abbasi, approximately fifty years later, refers to the rebellion of the Bakhtiyari and the tayefeh of the Jaki and Javaneki and the idemnity that they were forced to pay. 21 It also cites the bravery of Jahangir Khan of the Bakhtiyari and 200 of his men in fighting the Qizilbash of Rum, 22 Turkish tribes in Eastern Anatolia who had earlier been Safavid supporters, and then the appointment of Jahangir Khan along with several others to be in charge of the diversion of the Karun River into the Zayendehrud (the diversion point was located in the Bakhtiyari yailaq).

(Sardar Zafar writes that this Jahangir Khan was related to the Safavids on his mother’s side.) Finally, in a list of the leaders of Kurdistan and Luristan, passing reference is made to Khalil Khan, son of Jahangir, as governor of Bakhtiyari Luristan.  The growing importance of the Bakhtiyari is revealed in the Tadhkirat al-Muluk, 1725, in a listing of the rank and honor given to Persian amirs, the governor of the Bakhtiyari follows immediately after the four valis of Arabistan, Luristan-e Faili, Georgia, and Kurdistan.

The perceptive late seventeenth-century traveler Chardin makes only one direct reference to the tribes of Luristan, and he is most likely referring either to the Bakhtiyari or to the Faili Lurs.

To the East of Ispahan, and near adjoining to his territory lyes the Province of Lour-Estom, which is held to be a part of ancient Parthia, extending on Arabia’s side toward Basra. The peoples that Inhabit it, never mind the building of Cities, nor have any settl’d Abodes, but live in Tents, for the most part feeding their Flocks and their Heards, of which they have an infinite number. They are Govern’d by a Kaan who is set over them by the King of Persia but chosen from among themselves: and for the most part all of the same Race, the Father Succeeding the Son. So that there still remains among them some shadow of Liberty; however they pay both Tribute and Tenths. This Province furnished Ispahan and the Neighbouring parts with Cattel; which is the reason that the Governor of these People is greatly respected in those parts. Soleiman the third therefore at his coming to the Crown, commanded the General of the Musquetteers to send Royal Habit and Commission intoj all the Grandees. But the General of the Mus- quetters having had some quarrel with this Governor who is called Lour-Manoushar Kaan, neglected to do him that Honour, putting off his sending the King’s Present to him till six Months after. The Grandee impatiently brook’d the contempt; and being sufficiently convinced who was the occasion of it, for madness he tore in pieces the Habit which was presented him, saying withal, I value not the Habits, nor the commissions which the King of Persia’s General of the Musquetteers sends me.

Hanway mentions the division of the Bakhtiyari into two major tribes, the “Cahar Ling” and the “Efh Ling,” and he continues,

It is said, that the Bactiaris joined to the Lorians, would have been able to raise the siege of Isfahan, in the late revolution by the Afghans, if the antipathy which reigns between these two neighbouring people, had not prevented their acting in concert upon that important occasion: this spirit of dissenposion now brought both nations into great difficulties.

This was in 1722 at the Afghan siege of Isfahan when approximately 12,000 Bakhtiyari under Qasem Khan and Safi Khan participated in its ill-fated defense. Nader Shah, who rallied support, drove out the Afghans, and won the crown, faced the haunting specter of being overthrown by a rebelling tribe. Tribes in a state of rebellion have not only threatened most Iranian dynasties but; were also an important factor influencing foreign policy, and Wader Shah, like Shah ‘Abbas, had first to quell dissident tribes before he could begin to restore his borders.

In 1732, before he could march north to meet the Ottoman threat Wader Shah had to deal with the Bakhtiyari. Ottoman forces had at this time penetrated as far south as the Bakhtiyari where they met with continuous guerrilla-type warfare from them. At the same time the Haft and Chahar Leng Bakhtiyari were united in a rebellion against Wader, and thirty of the; khans and kadkhodas were imprisoned. ‘Ali Saleh Khan of the Haft Leng said that the tribes would continue in revolt because there were no leaders to guide them, and if he were released he would quiet the tribes and produce the 10,000 to 12,000 troops that Wader had previously requested. Fifteen khans were released, the remainder were kept as hostage order was restored, and the troops raised. This force then went on to subdue the Lurs. According to a different on source, not available to me, but also by Mohammad Kazem and dating from the same period, Wader himself, after a siege of 21 days, defeated the Bakhtiyari.  As punishment in an attempt to diminish their threat and to fortify the northeastern boundary, Nader sent 3000 Haft Leng families to Khorasan; however, in 1743-2,000 of them

returned to their own country; where they retired in the mountains resolving to shake off the Persian yoke. Nader being apprehensive that others would follow their example, sent a great body of Ousbegs to keep them in awe.

 

‘Ali Morad (of the Mamivand, a ta-yefeh of the Chahar Leng) had distinguished himself in assisting ’Ali Saleh in gaining the submission of the Bakhtiyari rebels, and although he was not an important leader in the Bakhtiyari, ‘Ali Morad had gained fame for himself in Nader’s campaign and victory against ‘Abdullah Pasha in Azerbaijan. The Nameh-ye ‘Alam ;Ara-ye Naderi continues on and reveals that ‘Ali Morad had been jealous of other military leaders and angry because he felt that he had been slighted when ranks had been awarded, and that he had been talking to the Bakhtiyari in Nader’s army about returning to the Bakhtiyari, raising a force, taking Isfahan, and restoring Tahmasp II, the Safavid shah whom Nader had dethroned. One of the Ottoman mules loaded with gold fell into ‘Ali Morad’s hands; he then returned to the Bakhtiyari and raised an army of nearly 20,000. After initial success he was joined by others, and he gathered together the leaders of the Haft Leng, Chahar. Leng and the Lurs of Khorramabad. He said: If I decide to become king, I shall cast coins in my name and have the khutbeh said in my name.

All of the leaders of the army from ‘Araq, Pars, and Hamadan are loyal to the Safavids. They will follow me, and after I destroy Nader’s rule, I’ll go to Khorasan, and I shall free Tahmasp who is now in prison there. The Royal Name is a great name, and if God is with me the people will follow me.
Shah Tahmasp will be satisfied with only ‘Araq and Khorasan, and I shall be content with Hamadan, Pars, and Kerman.

This speech apparently had its effect, and he ordered coins to be struck” with the following inscription: I am enraged, and I shall create a tumult and mint gold coins until their rightful master be found. He had a reputation for kindness with his troops, but he supposedly tortured the rich in order to obtain their wealth. Nader Shah began a pincer movement to put down the rebellion but a shipment of 10,000 tomans on their way to Nader for his transport was intercepted by ‘Ali Morad. When ‘Ali Morad was finally encircled, his troops fled, and he disappeared into the fastness of the Bakhtiyari mountains where he was captured two months later. He was taken to Shuster and gruesomely executed. This time Nader had 10,000 Bakhtiyari families transported to Khorasan.

While he was putting down the Bakhtiyari revolt, Nader Shah made plans for his attack on Qandahar. In this successful campaign his Bakhtiyari troops were to distinguish themselves, and the previously mentioned ’Ali Saleh, who led the Bakhtiyari contingent, was awarded the rank of khan and
sardar possibly the first Bakhtiyari khan to be so honored by a Persian monarch.

After the death of Nader Shah in 1747 the displaced Bakhtiyari returned to their territory; although part of the Bakhtiyari who had been left in Qandahar as an army of occupation never returned to Iran. In the anarchy following Nader’s death, ‘Ali Mordan of the Chahar Leng attempted (and succeeded for a short time, 1747-1750) to establish his suzerainty over much of Southwestern Iran. He ruled as vakil under the Safavid puppet, Isml’il III, and on the coins struck in this reign Ali Mordan refers to himself as “bandeh-ye Isma’il,” or the slave of Isma’il. In describing this period, Malcolm, one of the foremost nineteenth century historians of Iran, writes,

Such was the state of all the northern parts of the empire, when a chief of the Bukhteearee, Ali Murdan Khan, took possession of Isfahan, and determined to raise a pageant of the house of Soofee to the throne, in order that he might reconcile the inhabitants of that capital to his usurpation of regal power. Well satisfied that he could not effect this great object without aid, he invited several omrahs [pl. of amir] to join his standard; the principal of whom was Kareem Khan of the tribes of Zend. This chief was not of high birth, and had obtained no command in the army of Nadir; but he was distinguished for his good sense and courage. We are told by the historians of his reign, that Kereem Khan from the first enjoyed an equal rank with Ali Murdan: and that when it was agreed to raise a young prince of the race of Soofee to the throne, it was settled that one of the chiefs should be appointed his minister, and that the other should command the army. But it appears from other authorities, that Kereem did not consider himself on a level with Ali Murdan Khan. It is probable that his ambition at the commencement of the connexion was limited to the prospect of succeeding that leader, who was very old and had no children.
. . . The conduct of Kereem obtained him a popularity which excited the jealousy of Ali Murdan Khtn; and short period brought them to an open rupture. . . . Ali Murdan . . . put to death the governor of Isfahan; and it was obvious that Kerreem would be the next victim of his suspicion and resentment. Aware of his danger, and preferring open hostility to such friendship, Kerreem took the field with his followers, and declared himself the enemy of Ali Murdan, who, after a short contest with various fortune, was assassinated . . . and by his death left to his rival the undisputed possession of the southern provinces of Persia.

 

The remaining decades of the eighteenth century witnessed a duel for power between the Zands and the Qajars. As had been true of the Safavids and Afshars before them, the basis of power of both the Zands and the Qajars was centered around a military core of their own tribes. The eighteenth century characterized by a decline in cultivated area, depressed trade, and general insecurity. By the end of the century, Georgia had become a Russian protectorate and Afghanistan was permanently separated from Iran, although wars were to be fought over Persian claims to Afghan territory
until the mid nineteenth century. And in the first quarter of the nineteenth century Iran lost all claims to her provinces in the Caucasus.

There is little detailed information about the Bakhtiyari in the early Qajar period. However, R.G. Watson reports that Aql Mohammad Qajar, after defeating Jared b. Sadeq at Isfahan,

the mountainous countries inhabited by the Bakhtiari and Loors. Having obtained some successes over these tribes, he treated them with such severity, and permitted his soldiers to be guilty of such barbarities toward them, that the revengeful feelings of the mountaineers were deeply stirred, and a new army was raised to act against him. The soldiers composing this force were animated by the wrongs of men whose wives and daughters had been the prey of those they now stood against in the field. Their ardour carried all before it, and Aga Mahomed fled in disorder to Tehran, in which city he intrenched himself, and from which point his future operations were directed.
This struggle in one part of Persia gave time to Jafer to recruit his strength in another part of the country. [And he retook Isfahan] . . . Jafer was next employed in endeavouring to reduce to subjection his cousin Ismail, who raised an army in his interest in the Bakhtiari mountains. This force was defeated by Jafer, .  .  .

until 1813 did the Qajars manage to impose some control over the Bakhtiyari, and in that year the powerful crown prince Mohammad ’Ali Mirza forced As’ad Khan, the notorious brigand and Bakhtiyarvand khan, to surrender.  As’ad Khan had dared raid as far north as Tehran.

Mention has been made of the Bakhtiyari military contribution in the Safavid period and in Nader Shah’s army. The Qajars, too, utilized tribal contingents, and James Morier, contemporary with the early Qajar period, writes :

The two great tribes are the Bakhtiari and the Failee [Pusht-e Kuh Lurs]. They consist of one hundred thousand families each, which, at five persons in a family, makes two totals of five hundred thousand souls. The Baktiars, of all the tribes, send the most troops to the King’s service. The King’s body-guard consist of twelve thousand men, half of whom are disciplined in the European manner, and are called Jan-baz, in contradistinction to those raised and disciplined by the Princes, . . . who are called Ser-baz . . . The twelve thousand who form the King’s body-guard are taken indiscriminately from the tribes, or from the population of the cities, but principally from Mazanderan and the tribes connected with the King’s own race [Qajars or Turks]. They have their families and homes at Teheran, and in the neighbouring villages, and are ready at every call.

Malcolm, in greater detail, adds:

Every Chief of a tribe is obliged to furnish a quota, proportionate to the number of his followers. Each horseman receives provisions for himself and horse, when employed, and a small annual payment. (This seldom exceeds 5 or 6 tomans a year, and is paid by assignment on the revenue, which the receivers sometimes discount at a considerable loss. Every horseman has also an annual allowance of two ass-loads of grain. The officers have a larger pay than the men; but few receive more than 15 or 20 tomans a year, and or 5 ass-loads of grain. The ass-load is computed at 700 lbs. and its regulated value, if the government pay in money, is one toman.) This class of the army, unless there be a prospect of plunder, or their own chief is a commander, give their services very reluctantly. They are only obliged to attend a few months in the year; and, if not engaged in active hostilities, always return home during the winter.

Morier corroborates this description of the shah’s troops and supplements it by stating:

The horseman’s pay is about eight tumanss annually, for which he serves six months in the field, the other six he remains at home. He is paid twice in the year, half and half, in advance, and during the time he is in actual service receives a daily allowance of one man of barley for his horse, and straw in proportion. The horsemen are obliged to attend the muster and the review, which the king makes after the Nau-Ruz [new year], of all his troops, properly mounted and equipped, or they are severely punished. The Tufenkchi. or foot-soldier, gets seven tumans per annum, and half the year remains at home. The Wages are paid into the hands of the Khan of the tribe, who then delivers over the money to the subaltern officers . . . who . . pay the soldiers.

In describing the court of ‘Ali Mirza, the Prince Governor of Shiraz, Morier also adds:

In his actual service and pay the Prince has only a force of one thousand cavalry, of which two hundred (the quota furnished by the Baktiar tribe) form his body guard; but in an emergency he could sent [sic] to the war twenty thousand horsemen. His ‘troops provide their own arms and clothing, and they receive annually in pay forty piastres, and a daily allowance of one maun (seven pounds and a quarter) of barley, two mauns of straw, and a quarter of a maun of wheat, except in spring when their horses feed on the new herbage. They have further, each in his own country, for the maintenance of their families, a certain allotment of land, which they till and sow, and of which they reap the annual fruit. When a new levy is ordered, the head of each tribe brings forward the number which the state has required of him.

Another important contribution made by the tribes to the Iranian government was in the form of dues and taxes.

All the tribes pay tribute. When the King calls upon them for purposes of war, all (excepting the Arab and the Failee tribe) are obliged to send a proportion of men, who are always ready at his summons. The names of every one of such men, the names of their fathers, and other particulars of their family, are all registered in the Defter Khona at the seat of government; and at the feast of Norooz, they attend the King to inquire whether their services for that year are required: if required, they wait the encampment of his Majesty; if not, they are permitted to return, but in either case they receive a stated pay. __. . . Each tribe has its chief, who is always a Khan, and one of their own race. He generally remains with his people, and had a Vakeel at the capital, who attends daily at the Der-a KhonSh and transacts all the business of his principal.

Morier furnishes additional detail regarding the taxes paid:

The existence of these migratory tribes being advantageous to the government, they are little oppressed. They are taxed at certain established rates upon each head of cattle, and are called upon to serve in the king’s armies. They pay at the rate of five piastres for each camel, one piastre for each cow, the same for mares, one ‘abbasi or quarter-piastre for a sheep. When they cultivate the ground, they are fined according to the rates exacted from the other Rayahs. Should they not be cultivators, each ten Khfineh or houses provide one horseman mounted and armed; and each five, one footman, or Tufenkshi . . . The I’liy&ts are not compelled to bestow their labour upon public works, like the other Rayahs— they keep exclusively to their tents and tend their cattle. The Taxes they pay are levied by their chiefs who account with the government. Those who are inclined to elude taxation frequently do so by secreting their cattle in the mountains.

Both Morier and Malcolm have commented on the practice of keeping the tribal khans or members of their families as hostages.

Though some chiefs of tribes were compelled to place their families at the capital of the ruler they served, as hostages for their fidelity, others, and among them the most powerful, had lodged their wives and children, and the wealth they had accumulated by plunder, in their native towns or villages which they had fortified on the plea of providing against predatory attacks, but with the real view of rendering themselves in some degree independent of their sovereign.

In 1836 , during the reign of Mohammad Shah, Rawlinson notes that the Bakhtiyari and their dependencies were assessed a total of 14900 tomans: the Haft Leng with a population of 7000 families paid 4000 T.; the Chahar Leng, 8,000 families, 4,000 T.; the Dinaruni, 5,500 families, 2,000 T.;
and the dependencies, 7500 families, 4900 T. And he adds:

The Bakhtiyaris with their dependencies, number at present 28,800 families; . . . Their assessment is fixed at 100 Katirs (mules), the term Katir, however, being merely conventional, and used to denote a sum of money; which is increased or diminished according to the prosperous state of the tribes, and the power of the Persian government to exercise authority over them. . . ’ . At present it is valued at 100 Tumans; but the government for many years has been unable to realize this amount, or even, upon an average of 20 years, a moiety of it.

Eleven years later Baron de Bode notes that the ” . . . Chehar-langs are taxed at 15,000 tomans, but it is rare that this tax can be regularly levied, for it is only by main force that they can be compelled to pay it.” He adds that the sedentary Haft Leng in 195 villages around Borborud were required to pay 7,873 tomans in cash and 530 harvars of grain as their tax, but ” . . . the Iliyat migratory Bakhtiyari who are more numerous, only pay 3,600 tomans.”‘

In the first quarter of the nineteenth century a pattern emerges in the relationship between the Government of Iran and the pastoral nomadic tribes, particularly the Bakhtiyari. The Bakhtiyari, in addition to their economic contribution of animals and animal products to the general economy, paid taxes and furnished troops for the central and provincial governments. In return they were paid and maintained. The Bakhtiyari khans on occasion served as state officials, most often as military leaders. The khans were sometimes confirmed in their position as military leaders, but this depended on their ability to maintain order, pay the tax, and produce conscripts. For this they were given gifts of land or tax-collecting rights. The government
usually worked through the natural leaders of the tribe, although they were not above creating dissension in a tribe with bribes of money or promises of support.

A major reason for creating division within a tribe was that the government greatly feared, and with reason, the emergence of a leader who could unite and maintain the allegiance of his tribe. This could lead to unity within a tribal confederation and then to usurpation of the government’s power to rule. To lessen this threat the government kept members of the leading khans’ families, or in some cases, the khans themselves, near the court. These hostages also helped to insure the payment of the tax. On occasion the central government resorted to wholesale movement of tribal groups, particularly to the frontiers where their threat was greatly diminished, but also where their presence would aid in maintaining the borders against invaders.

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