Mention has been made of the intermediary role of the khans in collecting taxes and conscripting recruits for the government. It will be seen that a khan requires support from within the tribe in order to fulfill these functions.
There are-frequent references in the sources to a change of allegiance within a tribe and/or a part of a tribe to a khan. For example, the G-onduzlu were an Afshar tribe (a Turkicspeaking tribe of pastoral nomads scattered throughout Iran) that lived in the Southwestern part of the Bakhtiyari. Nader Shah removed them, but after his death they returned and once again submitted themselves to the Bakhtiyari khans. The Anzak Loraki are another example of a Turkic-speaking group that “sought the protection of the Bakhtiya-ri.” In both of these examples the tribes retained their own khans, but functioned as a part of the Bakhtiyari confederation and recognized the suzerainty of the dominant Bakhtiyari khan or khans.) Lord Curzon is not quite correct when he writes:
In local phraseology Bakhtiari has recently come to be used as a territorial rather than an ethnical designation. Mussulman seyids, and even Armenians living in the Bakhtiyari country, will call themselves Bakhtiaris, though they would agrily repudiate the title of Lur.
The designation “Bakhtiyari” is not “territorial” but political; it is a relationship in which tribesmen or inhabitants of a locality will recognize as their suzerain the one best qualified, usually from certain families but not necessarily from the same ethnmc group, to satisfy their needs. Bakhtiyari tribesmen, unless they are on the periphery of the Bakhtiyari territory, would recognize a member of one of the khanal families; however, non-Bakhtiyari minorities, and in this case Armenian peasants within the Bakhtiyari, would also acknowledge a Bakhtiyari khan as the one who could best protect their interest with the non-Armenian world. Tribesmen occupying border areas could recognize a Bakhtiyari but also a Qashqa’i khan or even an Arab shaikh if it were in their interest to do so. They seek out a khan who can give them security, pastures, and maintain their claims to their
rights. The khan need not be from the same tribe; tradition states that Haidar Kur, the eponymous ancestor of the Zarasvand khans, was from a “khanal” family of the Papi Lur.. If another khan shows promise of better performance, then allegiances may be transferred to him.
The khans, through their birth into “princely” lineages, have links, either consanguineal or affinal, political, economic, or all of these, internally within the tribe and externally as political leaders of the tribe or as landlords with the government in the capital or in provincial centers, with merchants and clergy in the cities, or with the leaders of other nomadic tribes. The khans, with these interlocking ties, can offer intermediary and integrating service to their tribesmen, who do not have them. Barth writes:
. . . the opponents in a conflict between a nomad and a farmer cannot maintain contact for long due to the movement of the nomad; the difference in their modes of life precluded all the activities usually associated with mediation and the settlement of conflicts . . . Between nomad and sedentary there are thus no mechanisms on the level of local communities for the regulation of social relations by law, and for the resolution of conflict by other means than by violence; nor would it seem possible to develop other than very imperfect mechanisms on that level. A workable mechanism can only be achieved by channelling such conflicts through administrative superstructures which bridge this difference by transforming the interests and the social units concerned to a point where they become comparable and thus able to communicate.
The khans are the point through which sedentary society and the government deal with the tribes. The Bakhtiyari khans had residences in the winter pastures, in their villages in Chahar Mahal, a rich agricultural region which borders the summer pastures, in Isfahan, and in Tehran. Thus they are known and available to sedentary society, and they are equals with administrative officials and able to protect the tribe’s interests. As the khans mediate differences and move between nomadic and sedentary society, they also integrate the tribe into the larger society of the country, and in turn their tribesmen are identified through them. They also serve a similar function in relation to other nomadic tribes and protect tribal areas against their encroachment.
Within the tribe the khans coordinate the migration, assign pastures, appoint Jcadkhodas/kalantars, mediate intra-tribal disputes, lead raids and military groups, and assign levies, taxes, and fines to tribesmen or to those passing through tribal territory. The khan as judge is described by Sir Henry Layard who spent parts of I838 -I841 attending Mohammad Taqi Khan, the paramount khan in this period:
[Muhammad Taqi Khan] seated himself on the raised platform of masonry where the chiefs and the ’rish- safids’ usually assembled in the afternoon and in the evening to talk over the events of the day, to listen to complaints, and to settle disputes. It was, as it were, the judgment seat of the tribe whence justice was administered, redress given and punishments awarded. The elders acted as assessors to the chief, who was all-powerful, and exercised the right of life and death over his people.
Mrs. Bishop, another perceptive nineteenth century traveler* refers to the Bakhtiyari khan as a “. . . despotic ruler and every tribesman is bound to hold himself at his disposal. Indeed, he was an autocratic ruler; however, it will be seen that there were limits to this autocracy.
In keeping with the historical forms of centralized leadership found elsewhere in the Middle East, he is traditionally granted a vast and not clearly delimited field of privilege and command, and power is conceived as emanating from him, rather than delegated to him by his subjects .
The political structure of the tribe below the level of the khan is such that there is no group that can resist his authority, other than by shifting their allegiance to another khan, either a family rival for their khan’s position or a khan outside of their tribe. The largest functioning group in the tribe is the camping unit where decisions are made regarding movement in the migration and cooperation in herding or harvesting. Decisions are reached by a consensus and unanimity of opinion. Again Barth provides the best analysis when he writes,
Every day the members of the camp must agree in their decision on the vital question of whether to move on or to stay camped, and if they move, by which route and how far they should move. These decisions are the very stuff of a pastoral nomad existence; they spell the difference between growth and prosperity of the herds, or loss and poverty. Every household head has an opinion, and the prosperity of his household is dependent on the wisdom of his decision. Yet a single disagreement on this question between members of the camp leads to fission of the camp as a group.
. . . The maintenance of a camp as a social unit thus requires the daily unanimous agreement of all members on economically vital questions. The political subjects of the chief are thus organized in small mutually hostile, and weakly led groups, each striving to maintain internal harmony and unanimity without coercive means. These are the only organized groups, and the only kind of leaders, within the Basseri system which can challenge the chief’s authority and with which he must be able to deal. The poor development of centrally controlled coercive means reflects this impotence of any potential opposition. In most situations, camps and their leaders can be controlled merely by assertive and definite orders from the chief. …
Given this socio-political structure with its underlying concept of absolute power, the khan is “selected” from a specific or “princely” descent group. Theoretically any jIi male in this line is called khan and is eligible to be the ruling khan, with an advantage going to those whose mothers were bibis (Persian, venerable lady) or daughters of khans and thus the more important wives; potentially, there would be greater support for their sons. A khan’s brothers, cousins, and uncles are all possible rivals. There is no tribal administration to be taken over by one hoping to be a khan, nor is there any administrative selection on one. All members of the “royal” lineage are treated with respect,; but the ruling khan is “selected” by assumption of the chiefly perogative of making decisions and giving orders, and recognition of this assumption is given by the tribesmen when they carry them out.
A chief thus achieves his position of authority by the same means as he maintains it: by its effective and continuous exercise, supported by the threat of corporal punishment of subordinates and assassination of competitors. . . . Nothing in the organization precludes a chief of strong will and personality from exercising authority over the subjects of another chief, if the two tribes have friendly relations.
Unless a commoner is in a structural position which permits him to adopt a consistently hostile or violent attitude to a chief, he must show deference and thus becomes liable to that chief’s influence and authority. Between friendly tribes, a division of authority over their component camps can thus only be maintained by a balanced opposition of the power centers represented by the chiefs themselves. In frequent cases, therefore, one chief is able to extend his sphere of control and encroach on, or even usurp, the authority of another.
In turn the khans are expected to be generous with j gifts and hospitality, courageous and successful in battle and in the hunt, and wise in judgment and in administering tribal affairs. The Bakhtiyari scorn any khan lacking these qualities, and khans with exemplary attributes go down into tribal legend. There are numerous stories of heroic khans fighting lions with their hands or with only a knife. Or, Sardar Zafar, who was known for his generosity, would first give a man a saddle, knowing that the recipient did not have a horse, and then unexpectedly give him a horse. At the same time his brother, Samsam es-Saltaneh, was criticized for his stinginess.
Barth, in the above quotation, discusses the necessity of maintaining intertribal opposition and hostility if the tribe is to remain as a distinct social group. Tribal, and in some cases intra-tribal, border areas are insecure and hostile buffer zones, because the khans are utilizing this mechanism to uphold their position. As will be seen in the following pages, certain khans have been able to assert ! their authority over a “friendly” tayefeh or tireh and to use this increased support to defeat or to intimidate others, and thereby gain a paramount position in the entire confederation. The khan of the tayefeh or tireh usually remains in his position, but subject to the decisions of the paramount khan. If the dominant khan is able to obtain governmental support or recognition, particularly as a tax collector or as a leader of a military contingent, his position as leader of the tribe or confederation is more secure, because he can count on the authority and some support from the government. Similarly a khan might purchase, or obtain in some other fashion, villages within or near his tribal territory and thus augment his military support.
He may then use his position as a landlord and tribal leader to gain concessions from the government. Villages, however, can also count as a negative factor, because they are subject to confiscation by the government and to raids by rivals. Each khan has a core of military support in the section of the tribe that travels with him when he is present. Amongst the Bakhtiyari it is called khanezadeh; among the Basseri it is called darbar (lit. court) and among the Qashqa’i, amaleh (workmen). “Among the members of the Darbar are found a personal valet, a master of the stores, a groom for the chief’s riding horses, a scribe, and a hunting-and- drinking companion cum court jester.” In many cases, and in addition to their own flocks, this special group herds all or part of the khan’s flocks. The men of the khanezadeh are expected to be on call and available for hunting, raiding, and supporting the khan. If the khan is able he can either pay or give grazing rights to men and to families who fulfill this function for him. The khanezadeh is able to function as a point of integration for outsiders into the tribe.