At the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth century most of the Bakhtiyari was under the governorship of the Georgian enunch, Manuchehr Khan Mo’atemed od Dauleh, and the provinces under his authority included Isfahan, Khuzistan, and most of Luristan. A northern corner of the Haft Leng territory was under the governor of Burujerd, and the southeastern corner of their yailaq, Fallat, was under the governor of Fars. Thus in Fallat the Haft Leng paid their animal head tax to the Bakhtiyari khans which finally ended up in Isfahan and the plow tax to the governor of Fars. The Bakhtiyari in this period was torn with internal fighting: in the Haft Leng, it was Ja’fer Qoli Khan and his brother Kalb ‘Ali Khan of the Duraki versus As’ad Khan and his son Ja’fer Qoli Khan of the Bakhtiyarvand (or as it is usually pronounced “Baidervand”) and in the Chahar Leng, it was ‘Ali Khan of the Kiyanursi versus his brothers Hasan Khan and Fath ‘Ali Khan’. Ali Khan had been successful in winning the support of a number of other tribes and in the process had aroused the suspicions of the Qajars. At Qajar instigation Hasan Khan and Path ‘Ali Khan turned ‘Ali Khan over to Path ‘Ali Shah, who had him blinded. Hasan Khan, supported by the government, became ruling khan. ‘Ali Khan’s sons were brought up in the secrecy of one of their father’s villages in Feridun, in the Chahar Leng yailaq.
At the age of 18 one of these sons, Mohammad Taqi Khan, killed his uncle and was recognized by the Kiyanursi as khan. He also married his uncle’s (Hasan Khan’s) daughter “. . . in order to bring the blood feud to an end, [she] was from her rank considered among the tribes as his principal wife, but they did not live together.”
Mohammad Taqi Khan was unusually successful in winning and holding the recognition of large numbers of the Bakhtiyari.
In calculating the actual force of an I’liyat tribe, like the Bakhtiyaris, it may be presumed that each family can produce at least one armed man, and indeed each family may be called upon by the chief for the services of one person in his wars; but it must be remembered that, both for the internal defence of the country, and for the actual cultivation of the soil and other necessary labors, a large portion of the male population will be unable to leave the tents. In the event of an external war, three- fourths of the males between the age of sixteen and sixty, would probably join the Chief.
Mohammad Taqi Khan gained the leadership of the Bakhtiyari by establishing alliances and through diplomacy. One of the most important non-Chahar Leng tribes to recognize Mohammad Taqi Khan’s suzerainty was the Janeki Garmsir, to whose khans he was related through his mother, which was made up largely of agriculturalists who grew rice in a single valley and seldom migrated. The men of this tribe were acknowledged to be superior warriors, and their support plus the strength of a khan’s own tribe would make this khan paramount in the Chahar Leng. Similarly the Janeki Sardsir were predominantly agricultural, but they did not give Mohammad Taqi Khan any military support unless it was in their own interest of self-defense. In about I836 the Janeki Sardsir khan, ‘Ali Gedor Khan, had become suspect and at the instigation of the Mo’atemed Qd-Dauleh, ‘Ali Gedor’s nephew Rustam murdered him. “The Mo’tamid pleased by this ready compliance with his wishes, recognized Rustam as chief of Janniki Sardesir, and supported him with his authority. The Kiyanursi, Mohammad Taqi Khan’s own tribe, had been greatly weakened by internecine fighting following the deposition of ‘Ali Khan and then again on the death of Hasan Khan.
They were nomadic, and from this group Mohammad .Taqi Khan drew his personal attendants. Mohammad Taqi Khan’s sister was married to Khalil Khan of the Boirahmedi in an attempt to end a blood-feud, and Layard describes him as “. . . more tinder his [Mohammad Taqi Khan’s] control than under the governor of Behbehan, and joined him in his wars, when not prevented by circumstances from doing so.”
Khalil Khan’s support was personal and only to Mohammad Taqi Khan, because upon the latter’s imprisonment he refused aid to his family and in fact turned him over to the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh.
Another source of major support for Mohammad Taqi Khan were the Suhuni led by Shefi’ Khan, who is called Muhammad Taqi Khan’s vazir by Layard and who was the collector of the annual animal tax of the Bakhtiyari. Shefi’ Khan, although he was the khan of the Suhuni, was himself from an Afshar tribe. The Suhuni territory was originally north of the Karun River, but Mohammad Taqi Khan gave them land south of it, and after his deposition, Shefi’ fled to the mountains while the Suhuni returned to their old territory and recognized either the suzerainty of Mohammad Mahdi Khan of the Mahmud Saleh (Mamsaleh) of the Chahar Leng or Ja’fer Qoli Khan of the Haft Leng.
The relations between Mohammad Taqi Khan and the Mo’atemed o.d-Dauleh, the Bakhtiyari, and the Arab tribes on the edge of the Bakhtiyari country are admirably illustrated in the following lengthy quotation:
The Moguwi was formerly a very large tribe, and its late Chief, known as the Khajah, had much power among the Bakhtiyaris. He murdered his own brother and his two uncles, who were related by blood to the great Chief. These murders did not remain unavenged. Mohammad Taki marched against him, destroyed his castle in Feridun, and carried away his wife and children and the greater part of his tribe. The remainder took refuge among the Bakhtiyaris^ within the government of Burujird. Khajah ’Abbas Khan fled to Isfahan, and under the protection of the governor, escaped the punishment he so justly merited. The Mo’atamid now finds him of service in intriguing with the chiefs, and fomenting dissensions among the tribes. . . . Ram Hormuz was formerly included in the government of Fars, and was under the immediate control of the chiefs of Behbehan. Its plain was, a few jears ago, ceded to Mohammad Taki by Mirza Mansur Khan, the popular chief of Behbehan, and brother of the present Mirza Komai in return for assistance afforded him by the Bakhtiyari Chief in expelling from the town a Persian army sent against him_by the governor of Shiraz. . . . The Arab chief of Ram-Hormuz, Sheikh Moslet, was put to death a few years ago by Mohammad Taki who had detected a correspondence between the Sheikh and Sultan Murad Mirza, inviting the prince into the country, and offering to seize the Bakhtiyari Chief. On the death of Sheikh Moslet, the greater part of the Arab tribe of Ali Khamis left Ram-Hormus, and settled on the northern bank of the Karun, between that river and Hawizah. They have since returned to the plain. . . . Mohammad Taki Khan endeavoured to settle several of his tribes in this singularly fertile plain. Strenuous and repeated opposition from the Persian government, however, frustrated his endeavours, which otherwise would have been crowned with success. He built several villages, and the plain by degrees assumed a flourishing appearance. The southern part of the district of Ram-Hormuz was, however, constantly exposed to the plundering incursions of the Kuhgelu. The Ali Khamis, also, whenever an opportunity occurred of falling upon the villages with impunity, revenged the death of their Sheikh by burning or carrying off the property of the inhabitants. . . .
The Kuhgelu destroyed a few villages, but Mohammed Taki soon compelled them to give satisfaction. . . . The annual tribute claimed by the government for Ram-Hormuz was, until lately, 3000 tomans, but, finding that Mohammad Taki was improving the country, they suddenly raised it to 5,000, a sufficient check on his endeavours to colonize the plain. Ram-Hormuz could scarcely furnish this yearly sum without ruining its villages. Since the capture of that patriotic chief, the Ali Khamis have returned to the plain under the present Sheikh Sultan.
Mohammad Taqi Khan also attempted to settle some of the Chahar Leng in Feridun where he and his father had purchased villages, but Layard again adds, “His endeavours were of course opposed by the government, and many villages were actually plundered at its instigation.” Similarly he distributed mares and stallions among the G-unduzlu to improve blood lines.
Sir Henry Rawlinson who accompanied a Persian force as a military advisor in 1836 and was with this group when it obtained the submission of the western tribes, including the Bakhtiyari under Mohammad Taqi Khan, adds:
The main power of the Bakhtiyaris . . . lies_in the hands of Mohammad Taki Khan, the chief of Janniki, who is a lineal descendant of ‘Ali Mardan Khan, the Bakhtiyari king of Persia. . . . At the outset of his career he was acknowledged chief of his own single tribe, and he owes his present powerful position solely to the distinguished ability with which he steered his course amid the broils and conflicts of the other tribes. The clans, one by one, have sought his protection, and enrolled themselves among his subjects; and he can now, at any time, bring into the field a well-armed force of 10,000 or 12,000 men.
He collects his revenues according to no arbitrary method, but in proportion to the fertility of the districts, and the prosperous state of his villages and tribes. He has done everything in his power to break the tribes of their nomadic habits, and to a great extent he has succeeded. In Feridun he has purchased very extensive lands, where he has founded numerous villages, and in the plain of Ram Hormuz, which he farms of the Shiraz government for 3000 Tomans annually, he has also settled a vast number of peaceful colonists.
Mohammad Taqi Khan’s diplomatic skill and his growing power over large sections of the Bakhtiyari, and his close relationship with Mirza Koma, governor of Behbehan, and with Arab tribes in Khuzistan, particularly the Cha’b of the Fellahiyeh district in the swampy area between the Karun and the Jerrahi rivers, who under Sahikh Thamer, were given summer grazing rights in the Bakhtiyari garmsir by Mohammad Taqi Khan, posed a threat to the authority of the government and especially to the governor of these provinces, the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh. The latter marched toward the Bakhtiyari at the head of a military detachment vising the pretext of collecting arrears in taxes and of punishing Mohammad Taqi Khan for corresponding with Mohammed Shah’s exiled uncle, ‘Ali Reza Mirza Zell es-Soltan, who reigned as ‘Adel Shah in l83l.
Layard, who was a witness to the struggle between Mohammad Taqi Khan and the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh, writes:
The Matamet, within whose government the Bakhtiyari tribes were included, had been constantly making demands upon him for arrears of tribute. Several persons having ‘berats,1 or Government orders for money, upon him had arrived at the castle. The Matamet’s ‘shutur-bashi,’ who had accompanied Shefia’ Khan from Isfahan, had been sent to collect ten thousand tomans (about S>000 L), three thousand of which were to go to Tehran as part of the revenue which was due to the Shah, three thousand were for the Metamet himself, and the remainder was to satisfy various claims made upon the royal treasury by private individuals. The usual mode of settling such claims was by giving the claimants drafts upon villages, tribal chiefs, or wealthy notables, and leaving them to get them cashed as they best could. The bearers of these documents, which were frequently sold by the original possessors with a very large discount, generally quartered themselves upon the persons whom they were drawn, and remained for many months–even years— until the sum for which they were given was paid. . . . It was not considered prudent to dismiss them without first satisfying them by the payment of part, if not the whole, of their claims, and they were lodged in the castle and treated as guests.
‘Ali Naqi Khan, the brother of Mohammad Taqi Khan, who had been kept in Tehran as a hostage, accompanied the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh as guide. Mohammad Shah had offered Mohammad Taqi Khan, through ‘Ali Naqi Khan, the government of the Bakhtiyari and of Khuzistan, if the latter would
accompany troops across the mountains. The purpose of the troops, so it was alleged, was to collect the arrears of Shustar, Dezful, and Hawizeh. Without this assistance and the restraint of Mohammad Taqi Khan, the Persian force with its three guns could not have moved through the Bakhtiyari.
Mohammad Taqi Khan was in a difficult position. He could not collect the 10,000 tomans without weakening his own relationship with the tribes, because the collection could only have been made forcibly. Also, the tribes knew this, and many of the khans supported the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh, because they were rivals for Mohammad Taqi Khan’s power or because they could be bought off by the Mo’atemed. Not only was Mohammad Taqi Khan’s political position in danger, but also there was the threat that his property would be confiscated.
His wealth, like that of other chiefs of these nomade [sic] tribes, consisted principally in flocks and herds; actual specie they very seldom possess, and
the enormous sum that the Mo’tamid had represented to be in Mohammed Taki’s possession was such a ridiculous exaggeration as a Persian alone could credit.
Mohammed Taki’s actual property might have consisted of 1500 buffaloes, 50 excellent Arab mares, some of which were valued at very high prices, and could have been sold for $00 tomans (250L) in Khuzistan; the same number of good Cha’b stallions, 500 broodmares, and 500 horses of Lur and mixed breeds, and about 10,000 sheep and goats. This I consider as having been about the whole amount of his property. Mohammed Taki, a despotic chief, had of course a certain power over the property of those who lived under his authority.
Mohammad Taqi Khan was aware of the strained relations between Iran and Great Britain over Afghanistan and the suspension of diplomatic relations between them. With the British occupation of Kharg island (1838 ) at the head of the Persian Gulf there had been rumors in Khuzistan and Luristan of an impending British invasion. Layard writes:
He probably hoped that if war were to break out between England and Persia he might avail himself of the opportunity to proclaim his independence. He had at his command many thousands of the finest and most daring horsemen and most skillful matchlockmen in Persia, and he had reason to believe that the force already at his disposal might be greatly increased should he bring about a general rising against the Shah, to be supported by English money, bayonets, and artillery. He was desirous, therefore, of communicating with the British authorities at Karak, and learning whether, in the event of war, they would be prepared to accept his assistance, and to enter into an agreement with him to protect him against the vengeance of the Shah, and to recognize him as the supreme chief in Khuzistan on the conclusion of peace. He accordingly begged me to proceed to that island in order to ascertain if possible, the intentions of the British Government, and to submit his proposals to the commander of the British forces there.
Layard had discussed the importance of trade with Mohammad Taqi Khan (along with ” . . . English money, bayonets, and artillery . . .”) and had raised the possibility of opening a road through the Bakhtiyari which would join Central Iran with the Persian Gulf and international trade; therefore, Mohammad Taqi Khan had also authorized Layard to inform the British that he was prepared to build roads and provide security for their goods on them if they would begin to trade with the Bakhtiyari. Layard so informed the official at Kharg who in turn communicated the following information
to India:
[Mohammad Taqi Khan] . . . had been grievously offended by the present Government of Persia, and was not disposed to submit any longer to the tyranny and extortion to which he had been subjected, but whether to raise the standard of revolt in his own behalf, as a lineal descendant of Alee Mardan Khan, the Bakh- tiyaree Monarch of Persia, or whether to support the claims of Ally Shah (the uncle of the present king) to the throne, were points on which he had not yet determined.
Captain (or Colonel) S. Hennell, who had been resident of the East India Company at Bushehr, but who had left for Kharg island when relations with Iran were broken off, reported to India his conversations with Layard. In reply to Captain Hennell’s suggestion that Mohammad Taqi Khan should
maintain his allegiance to Muhammad Shah, Layard said:
[that he] hardly expected that the propositions of the Bakhtiyaree Chief would be entertained by the British authorities, but looking at that Chiefs [sic] powerful influence, which extended from Ispahan to Mohumrah, and the large body of devoted Troops he could bring into the Field, viz.- 15000 well armed men, he had considered his offers of connecting himself with the British Government, to be sufficient importance to render it advisable that they should be made aware of their possessing if necessary so powerful auxiliary in the heart of Persia. Mr. Layard then spoke of the very liberal and extended views of Mahomed Tuchee khan, his love of justice, the severity with which he punished all acts of aggression and bloodshed, and above all his earnest desire to promote the civilization of his people, by opening new channels for Trade and Commerce. Among other plans entertained by him was that of throwing open the navigation of the river Karoon, which thro’ its branches was accessible for boats as high as Desfool and Shuster. By means of this water carriage he was desirous of finding a market for the grain, wool, gallnuts, gum mastic, and tobacco, of which large surplus quantities were raised by his subjects. I answered that as no interruption in the commercial intercourse between Persia and India had as yet taken place the Khan would have the same facilities of trading, as a private individual with India, as those possessed by the other Persian Merchants.
Layard, after his talks with Hennell, wrote, realistically:
The information that I obtained from Colonel Hennell led me to infer that the suspension of diplomatic relations with the Shah and the occupation of Karak were not likely to lead to war, but that the English and Persian Governments would probably come, ere long, to an arrangement. I could not, therefore, encourage Mehemet Taki Khan to look to any support from England in his designs for establishing his independence. But I had grounds for hoping that a trade might be opened between the province of Khuzistan and the Bakhtiyari Mountains and India and Europe.
Layard’s hope for British trade with the Bakhtiyari were not to be realized, partly because of the impending defeat of Mohammad Taqi Khan and his imprisonment in Tehran, which resulted in an intensification of tribal rivalries and general insecurity in the area. In the 1880s the British were to take a new interest in Khuzistan and the Bakhtiyari as a shortened trade route to Central Iran, but this time because of increased Russian political and economic competition. British interests were to repeat Layard*s concern for commercial development and political-military support under the guise of introducing “civilization.” And as they proceeded they were to deal with tribal leaders as independent centers of power.
Shortly before Layard1s departure for Kharg island, Mohammad Taqi Khan had not yet decided how he should receive the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh. The latter’s troops had passed through the most difficult part of the mountains, and as they moved into the lower, broader, and more agricultural valleys the troops plundered and exacted provisions from the countryside and added to the insecurity of the area.
Mohammad Taqi Khan’s brothers and the other khans, especially Shefi’ Khan, advised him to allow the Iranian regiment to proceed through the Bakhtiyari to Khuzistan to collect the tax there. They also urged him to collect as much of the Bakhtiyari tax as possible, but not to call up the Bakhtiyari forces and give the Mo’atemed od-Dauleh a pretext to attack.
The Mo’atemed od-Dauleh and his two regiments advanced to the plain of Mai Amir, the side of the mediaeval capital of the Atabaks of Luristan, where negotiations continued for forty days. The Mo’atemed renewed the original promise of the Shah, offered a khel’at, the royal robe of honor, and
swore on a Koran that no harm would befall Mohammad Taqi Khan and his family. The latter refused to accept because he suspected a trap.
Mohammad Taqi Khan vacillated between attacking the Persian camp and temporizing under the illusion that the Mo’atemed would leave. This last tactic received strongest support from th e Khan’s brother, ‘Ali Naqi Khan, who after long residence in Tehran as a hostage had become recognized amongst the Bakhtiyari as being ” . . . well acquainted with all the tricks and arts by which Persian rulers are wont to entrap their victims, and to be able to frustrate and defeat them.” 102 ‘Ali Naqi Khan was fearful that if the Bakhtiyari attack were successful the Shah would seek retribution with a larger force; therefore, he continued to push Mohammad Taqi Khan toward conciliation. During this period of Bakhtiyari indecision the Mo’atemedod-Dauleh suddenly struck camp and left for Shuster, and Mohammad Taqi Khan hoped to buy him off with gifts.